Privacy / Silent Payments

One code to share.
A new destination each time.

Receive on-chain bitcoin with one reusable code. Understand who can see what, how your wallet finds payments, and how to recover them.

Start with the idea
From first principles to protocol details · Checked 14 Nov 2026
READING MODE

One public code. Separate payments.

Imagine putting a Bitcoin donation address on your website. With an ordinary reused address, anyone can look up its receipts. Silent Payments let you publish one reusable receiving code while compatible senders create different on-chain destinations for their payments, including repeated payments from the same person.

You receive bitcoin on the Bitcoin blockchain. There is no new coin, channel or service-held balance. The mainnet code begins with sp1; each payment creates a Taproot output. Your wallet discovers it by scanning, even if it was offline when the payment arrived.

Watch Silent Payments, explained in 2 minutes. Captions available.

The promise is narrower than anonymous bitcoin: publishing the code does not, by itself, publish a list of incoming payments. Amounts and transaction inputs remain public. A sender knows their own payments, and later spending can link receipts.

  • Public donations or tips: a reusable code avoids handing out a fresh address each time. Budget for scanning and recovery.
  • A one-off payment: a fresh ordinary address is a simple choice when you can exchange it securely. Silent Payments are not automatically better.
  • Occasional mobile receiving: understand battery, data and catch-up scanning. A payment can exist before the app displays it.
  • Your own infrastructure: running the scanner yourself gives you control over scanning credentials and the data source, with maintenance costs.

Silent Payments: protocol overview ↗ · BIP 352: Silent Payments ↗

Follow a payment from both sides.

Keep the receiver’s code unchanged. Let Alice pay twice, compare what different observers can learn, then help the receiver find the payments. The illustration uses invented identifiers, not valid addresses or cryptographic calculations.

Focus view

Focus on one stage. Your example stays intact.

Interactive explanation · fictional data

Share once. Receive repeatedly.

Receiversp1… · R7Public receiving code
Alice · first paymentSame public code
Alice · pays againSame public code
Charlie · another paymentSame public code

Share the code off-chain. It contains public scan and spend keys, not private keys.

Illustrative identifiers and seven fictional transactions. No real keys, cryptography, wallet connection or funds. Each example block contains one candidate transaction.

How Silent Payments work

1. Share the public receiving code. 2. The sender uses input secrets and receiver public keys to derive a destination. 3. The receiver uses input public data and the scan private key to find the same destination. 4. Only the spend private key authorizes spending. Amounts remain public; later co-spending can link receipts. Restore from at or before the first payment.

What you gain. What you take on.

Silent Payments remove the need to exchange a new address for every payment or send a separate on-chain notification transaction. The receiver need not be online to answer the sender. Outputs use the ordinary Taproot form; they do not carry a special Silent Payments marker. This does not prevent contextual analysis of a transaction.

Both wallets need the relevant support. Ordinary Taproot support alone is insufficient. Sending, receiving, scanning and hardware signing are distinct capabilities. Discovery consumes resources; restoration can require a substantial scan.

There is no special protocol surcharge. Ordinary Bitcoin transaction fees still apply, and scanning services can have their own terms. No extra notification transaction does not mean every payment is cheap.

BIP 352: Silent Payments ↗ · Silent Payments: wallet support directory ↗

Private from whom?

An observer sees amounts, inputs, outputs and confirmations. Knowing the public code alone does not identify its receipts. A sender knows the outputs they created. Merchants, exchanges and network services may have additional records; Silent Payments do not erase identity or network metadata.

Spending received outputs together creates a visible connection. Common ownership is a heuristic, not proof, especially with collaborative transactions. Use private wallet labels and deliberate coin selection. Revealing a receipt or a wallet screenshot can expose relationships you wanted to keep separate.

Share the sp1 code, not a derived bc1p destination. A derived destination belongs to a specific payment construction. Paying it directly can defeat discovery by the receiver’s scanner and reintroduce address reuse.

A service with the scan private key and spend public key can identify receipts. It cannot spend with those credentials alone. A labeled public code retains the same scan public key: people comparing such codes can link them. Labels are useful organization, not separate public identities.

Silent Payments: protocol overview ↗ · Bitcoin.org: transaction privacy ↗ · BIP 352: Silent Payments ↗

Choose the whole workflow.

Documentation checked 14 November 2026. These are documented capabilities, not live-funds or hardware interoperability tests. Check the exact released app, firmware and recovery pairing before use.

Send, receive and scanning are separate questions
SetupDocumented workflowBoundary to check
Cake WalletSending and receiving; local scanning using server-supplied tweak data.First Bitcoin account only. Check the tweak server, not just the ordinary node setting.
Sparrow + FrigateSilent Payment workflows in current releases; receiving via a scanner.Frigate receives the scan private key and spend public key. Hardware support depends on the signer and direction.
BitBoxApp + BitBox02 / NovaSending support is documented.Receiving and spending received outputs are not verified here. Do not infer them from sending support.
BlueWallet, Nunchuk, WasabiSending to a Silent Payments code. Listed in the Silent Payments wallet directory on 16 November 2026.Sending only: they cannot receive. Wasabi supports it for software wallets, not hardware-wallet accounts.
Exchanges and custodial servicesNone documented on 16 November 2026.If an exchange will not pay a Silent Payments code, withdraw to your own wallet first and send from there.

Update hardware firmware. BitBox’s Dixence advisory describes a Silent Payments fund-locking issue affecting firmware 9.21.0–9.26.4 with a malicious host, fixed in 9.26.5. Follow the vendor’s current update guidance.

A software library or open pull request does not establish support in a released wallet. For hardware, ask separately whether it can help send to a code and sign a spend from a received output.

Cake Wallet: Silent Payments ↗ · Sparrow: release notes ↗ · Frigate: scanner architecture and privacy ↗ · BitBox: Dixence security update ↗ · Silent Payments: wallet support directory ↗

Set up, test and troubleshoot.

Choose receiving support, follow the wallet’s backup procedure and keep recovery material offline. Record the wallet, account, creation date or height, and scanning setup. Use a small first payment and rehearse finding it after a compatible restore.

  1. In Cake Wallet’s Bitcoin Receive screen, open the address-type picker and select Silent Payments. Use the first Bitcoin account.
  2. Open Settings → Bitcoin Settings → Silent Payments. Enable Set Silent Payments always scanning, or scan when needed.
  3. Let scanning catch up. A restored wallet must scan from at or before its first possible payment.
  4. Share the complete code or QR through an authenticated channel. The sender uses a compatible wallet, verifies the recipient, amount and fee, then signs. Confirm the receipt in the receiving wallet.
Code rejected?
Check the complete code, network and sending support. Do not strip its prefix or substitute a destination from a block explorer. Ask for a fresh ordinary address if necessary.
Payment not visible?
Separate transaction broadcast/confirmation from wallet discovery. Check scanning progress, its start height and the scanning connection. Do not resend solely because the receiver’s display is empty.
Restored balance is zero?
Check Silent Payments compatibility, account, labels and scan range. Importing the same seed into an ordinary wallet does not guarantee discovery.
Need to raise the fee?
Cake documents no fee-bump control for sends to Silent Payment codes. This is a wallet limitation, not a protocol ban on replacement. Check the sender’s fee-management support before paying.

Cake Wallet: Silent Payments ↗ · Cake Wallet: Bitcoin account and fee behavior ↗

The wallet does the finding.

A conventional wallet can derive receiving addresses ahead of time. Silent Payments discovery needs transaction data. The scan private key finds receipts; the spend private key is needed to spend.

  • Own node and scanner: you control the data source and scanning environment, with storage and maintenance responsibilities.
  • Public tweak data, local scan: the server supplies data without needing your scan private key. Network metadata and subsequent queries still matter.
  • Remote scan service: the operator receives scanning credentials and can identify incoming payments. Self-hosting changes who controls that access.

Cake falls back to its tweak-data server if the selected node cannot supply that data, without changing the ordinary node setting. Frigate scans server-side and holds client scanning keys in memory for the session. Memory-only handling does not make the operator unable to see them.

Being offline does not prevent payment on-chain. It delays discovery and display until the wallet reconnects and catches up. No balance displayed is not proof that no payment exists.

Silent Payments: scanning models ↗ · Cake Wallet: Silent Payments ↗ · Frigate: scanner architecture and privacy ↗

Back up the ability to find the money.

A seed needs a compatible recovery workflow. Keep the supported backup, account or derivation information, a conservative wallet birthday and required payment-label metadata. Starting too early costs scanning work; starting too late can miss payments. Test with a modest amount before relying on the setup.

Recovering currently unspent funds and reconstructing every historical receipt are different tasks. A scanner that skips spent outputs can help with the first without doing the second. Check the actual restore mode and label handling.

BIP 392’s draft descriptor format distinguishes spscan, containing a scan private key and spend public key, from spspend, containing both private keys. Neither is a publicly shareable receiving code. An ordinary is not a substitute for Silent Payments recovery information.

BIP 352: Silent Payments ↗ · BIP 392: Silent Payment descriptors ↗

The key derivation, one step at a time.

Finding and spending are different permissions

Scan private key: identifies incoming payments

Spend private key: authorizes spending

The public code contains the corresponding public keys. Sharing a scan private key exposes receipts, but does not by itself grant spending permission.

The receiver has two key pairs. Uppercase letters denote curve points; lowercase letters denote secret scalars. G is the secp256k1 generator. The public code carries B_scan and B_spend, never their private counterparts.

The sender uses input secrets with the receiver’s scan public key. The receiver uses input public keys with their scan private key. Both reach the same shared point: a · B_scan = b_scan · A, because A = a · G and B_scan = b_scan · G. An observer with only public data cannot perform either private calculation.

a = Σ a_i    A = a · G = Σ A_i
h = H_Inputs(smallest_outpoint || A)
S = h · a · B_scan = h · b_scan · A
t_k = H_SharedSecret(serialize(S) || serialize32(k))
P_k = B_spend + t_k · G
d_k = (b_spend + t_k) mod n
  1. Collect inputs: sum the normalized eligible secret scalars into a; the corresponding public points sum to A.
  2. Bind the transaction: h hashes the smallest outpoint from all inputs with A. The two parties derive the same input-bound shared secret S.
  3. Create the output: hash S with counter k to get tweak t_k. Add its public point to the receiver’s spend public key to obtain P_k.
  4. Spend: the receiver adds the tweak to the spend private key to obtain d_k. The sender’s knowledge of the shared secret does not reveal that spend private key.

k counts derivations for the recipient group, not positions in the transaction’s output list. New spent outpoints separate destinations even when input keys recur. Changing only the payment amount is not what changes the destination.

H_Inputs and H_SharedSecret are BIP 352 tagged hashes; n is the curve order. This unlabeled notation omits encodings, parity normalization, invalid-scalar checks and label handling. It explains the mechanism; use the specification and test vectors for implementation.

BIP 352: Silent Payments ↗ · BitBox: the cryptography ↗

The details that change implementations.

Eligible shared-secret input types are P2PKH, P2WPKH, P2SH-P2WPKH and P2TR under BIP 352’s extraction rules. Other known-script inputs may fund the transaction without contributing to the key sum. The smallest outpoint is chosen from all transaction inputs. Changing inputs during fee replacement requires recalculating destinations.

BIP 375 adds PSBT fields for sending, including shared-secret contributions and proofs so participants can verify construction without exporting input private keys. BIP 376 addresses spending received outputs and the information signers need to reconstruct and validate their keys. Ordinary Taproot signing support does not establish either capability.

At this review, BIP 352 is Complete; BIPs 375, 376 and 392 are Draft. Specification status is separate from released wallet support.

BIP 352 recommends that input keys belong to one entity because there is no formal security proof for the collaborative setting. Do not assume CoinJoin or PayJoin can be combined with Silent Payments in your wallet. Sparrow’s release notes explicitly disable PayJoin for transactions containing Silent Payment outputs.

BIP 352: Silent Payments ↗ · BIP 375: sending with PSBTs ↗ · BIP 376: spending with PSBTs ↗ · Sparrow: release notes ↗

How the alternatives compare.

  • Fresh ordinary addresses: arrange a new destination each time. Simple when secure address exchange is easy; no Silent Payments scan is required.
  • BIP 47 / PayNyms: a different reusable-code protocol. The classic on-chain notification establishes a relationship for discovering payments. Silent Payments trade that notification for scanning.
  • PayJoin / CoinJoin: collaborative construction changes how transaction inputs and outputs can be interpreted. It solves a different problem from publishing a reusable receiving code.
  • Lightning: uses channels with different liquidity and recovery requirements. Silent Payments remain on-chain transactions.

Choose the disclosure you want to reduce and the workflow you can maintain. No single feature replaces good receiving, spending, network and backup practices.

BIP 47 and Silent Payments compared ↗ · Bitcoin.org: transaction privacy ↗

A small rehearsal beats an assumption.

  1. Can the selected wallet receive, scan and spend, rather than just recognize the code?
  2. Who holds the scan private key, and which server actually supplies data or performs scanning?
  3. Can you discover a test receipt after restoring from the supported backup?
  4. Have you preserved the birthday, account and necessary label metadata?
  5. Does the exact sender and signer pairing support the payment and your intended fee-management workflow?
  6. Are unrelated receipts still kept separate when you spend?

Continue with Bitcoin privacy, PayNyms, or the transaction workbench to explore what happens after receiving.

Silent Payments: developer resources ↗

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