Why it exists
BIP 375 proposes PSBT v2 extensions for sending Silent Payments. A Silent Payment destination depends on the transaction inputs as well as the recipient’s reusable payment code. That creates an extra coordination problem when the wallet constructing the transaction does not control every input key.
How it works
The package can record the recipient’s scan and spend keys before the final output script is known. Signers contribute elliptic-curve shared-secret information for eligible inputs, with proofs that other participants can verify. This lets the output be calculated without handing all private keys to the coordinator.
Once the required contributions are available, the output scripts are derived and the input/output set is frozen. A signer must not add transaction signatures while an output script is still missing. The current proposal requires SIGHASH_ALL for these transactions and defines additional checks for input eligibility, proofs and change recognition.
A practical example
Suppose two devices control two inputs funding a payment to the same Silent Payment code. Each contributes the required information for its input. The coordinator and signers verify those contributions and derive the recipient output. If the coordinator later swaps an input, the destination calculation is no longer the one everyone checked; the construction and verification must be revisited before signing.
What to keep in mind
This is a Draft extension with version-specific rules. Ordinary PSBT v2 compatibility only applies once every output script is populated. A tool that merely preserves unknown fields cannot be assumed to verify Silent Payment destinations safely.
Status & implementation
The specification provides test vectors and a validation implementation, but remains Draft. These are development evidence, not proof that a particular hardware signer or production wallet supports the workflow.
Specification status: Draft · Sources checked 13 November 2026
