Why it exists
BIP 119 proposes CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, an opcode for committing an output to a future transaction template. It would let a spending condition restrict the shape of the next transaction, reducing reliance on pre-signed transaction chains for some contract designs.
How it works
The proposed opcode compares a 32-byte commitment with a hash calculated from the spending transaction. The committed fields include its version, locktime, input count, input sequences, output count and outputs, plus the index of the input executing the check. It does not simply commit to an ordinary transaction ID.
A successful template check can be combined with other script conditions. The proposal assigns new semantics to OP_NOP4 through a soft fork. Under rules without activation, that opcode does not provide the intended template protection, making premature use unsafe.
A practical example
Imagine a hypothetical distribution output committed to a transaction that pays 60,000 sats to one recipient and 40,000 sats to another, with its fees and funding arranged in advance. A spending transaction redirecting either committed output would fail the proposed check. This illustrates the restriction; it is not a deployable wallet recipe.
What to keep in mind
Committing outputs in advance creates practical questions about fee flexibility, recovery paths and later changes in user intent. CTV does not automatically design a safe vault, choose beneficiaries, or protect a policy whose author committed the wrong destinations.
Status & implementation
BIP 119 remains Draft in the official repository. Its reference implementation describes proposed validation semantics, not evidence that current mainnet consensus enforces the opcode. Treat applications built around it as proposal analysis until deployment is independently established.
Specification status: Draft · Sources checked 13 November 2026
